Swedish politicians and the military have to invent rationales for their NATO involvement. This leads them to come up with exotic ideas such as the need to fortify Gotland to respond to the Russian threat.
As is known, a phobia means a haunting fear, with no logical explanation to be found for it. In this literal medical sense, the attitude to Russia of some of its European neighbours is not a phobia, of course. First, because any emotional statements voiced by representatives of the European body politic have quite a solid foundation underpinning them. And that one is formed by their own intentions, historical experience or, at least, tactical considerations.
It is all the same today – Swedish army chief’s statements that Russia could attack the island of Gotland, which is part of Sweden, do not mean there is something wrong with his psycho-emotional health. This, on the opposite, is quite logical when it comes to both Sweden’s foreign policy and the record of its relations with Russia. Even more so, when the Swedish defence head adds that the island, if needed, can be also used ‘for assault operations’. Presumably, against Russia and its outpost on the Southern Baltic coast, Kaliningrad.
The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO gave these states a fundamentally new standing in world affairs. Without any serious grounds to do it, they refused from their years-long neutral status, which was the only thing making them at least visible on the global political landscape. And, again, it is absolutely unimportant that for decades Sweden anyway had its military planning linked to USA and its allies in Western Europe. Quite formally, this country, like Finland, used to occupy its unique niche, which had not only brought practical benefits, but also had given a point to notice them at all. Well, this has ended lately.
Out of prominent global diplomacy figures, with their neutral opinion quoted and forums used for informal talks, Stockholm and Helsinki turned into ordinary members of a military bloc headed by USA. The likes of, say, Bulgaria or former Baltic republics of the USSR. All the more so, those of insignificant size and with a low demographic potential.
Moreover, even Poland and Romania are more important Americans’ partners. Simply because they are placed right near the main battlefield of today and have significant populations. Sweden and Finland can hardly offer anything in this respect. Their total population is a bit over 15 million people living in quite challenging topography and climate.
Despite the current efforts of leading powers to prepare for a standoff in high altitudes, boreal forests of taiga and mountains are not the best geographies for deploying major military contingents. There are no ‘buffers’ to wage proxy wars against Russia there: in case of a problem, things will move very fast. This might have been the reason for Russia’s reserved stance regarding the accession of these two countries to NATO.
In other words, Sweden and Finland are now going through a rapid degradation of their status in international politics and are not quite sure, what to do about it. The common lack of ability of the European elite to use reason looking at developments around them helps them face the consequences, to an extent. For quite a long time already, Europeans have lived in their own imaginary world, almost losing the skill to link causes with consequences. This is fairly a blissful state, which is mainly because today even Europe’s domestic affairs are beyond its control. A nirvana, from which European leaders cannot be already pulled from.
However, this does not spare Sweden and Finland the need to seek compensation for the positions they have suddenly lost. First, the loss of the neutral power status reduced the volume of diplomats’ work, but they still need to do their job. Second, people anyway should have some food for thought to discuss finding grounds to believe that the recent foreign policy disaster was really worth it.
Further, a basic chain of logical reasoning causes these two states to think how they can convince USA or Britain of their essential roles. It is a bit easier for Finland, as it has a common border with Russia at least. However, even for this scenario, so far there are no serious plans of the Americans to create a military infrastructure, which will be big enough to channel investments.
Things are more complicated for the Swedes – there is no clear point for having them at NATO. They were dragged there ‘just to join the club’: simply to show Russia how wrong it had supposedly been by deciding to defend its national interests in Ukraine. Again, exactly the need for a deliberate gesture against Moscow was the only reason why Sweden, in a snap, ceased to be a prominent stakeholder in international dialogue. Well, it is widely known that such gestures do not have a value in real international relations.
Now Swedish politicians and the military have to invent rationales for their NATO involvement. First and foremost, for the Americans. And, a little bit, for their own citizens, although Europe has long been ignoring their opinions. This leads them to come up with exotic ideas such as the need to fortify Gotland.
However, such ideas do not appear from nowhere. They are underpinned by long-standing historical experience of confrontation with Russia and aggressive claims against its interests and security. Before the Kingdom of Sweden refused from active engagement in European affairs, it had never been on friendly terms with Russia. Their relations were based on aggression taking turns with fear.
The groundwork for this was the Swedes’ ‘eastward push’ in 12–13 centuries. Having conquered Finnish lands within a few decades, the Swedes tried to enter territories controlled by Novgorod. At that point, Panic fear quickly took the place of the brisk aggression: in 1240, Alexander Nevsky defeated the Swedes, after which they were never seen close to Russia’s borders for more than a hundred years. But when they made another attempt in 1348, princes of Moscow did not even send a dedicated retinue against them – the Novgorodians managed with their own forces. The Swedes could get a foothold in Russian territories only during the Time of Troubles in early 17th century. At that time, they occupied the mouth of River Neva and the lands next to it. But they were expelled from there too during the rule of Peter the Great, which paved the way for the demise of Sweden as a major military power in Europe. The Russians could have done it 50 years earlier but they were busy addressing a more important, Ukrainian, issue.
Eventually, a few failed wars with Russia deprived Sweden even of its gains in Finland. But the combination of fear and aggression remained a decisive factor defining Sweden’s attitude to Russia ever since. And this is not a phobia at all – this mix of attitudes is based on quite real grounds rooted in history. So, today when the Swedish ‘commander’ says that Russia could invade Gotland, while stressing the importance of this place of arms for the West’s offensive action, he is voicing, in a simplistic manner, these crucial parts of the Swedish national narrative and historical memory.
At the end of the day, Sweden cannot offer their NATO allies anything apart from its own concerns.