The US does have grounds for its vehement reaction to the PRC President’s European tour: China is placing one of its stakes on using France, Germany and some other EU states as ‘a weak link’ within the broader Western coalition.
‘Even paranoids have real enemies’, says a well-known aphorism attributed to a great political figure of the past. It means that even the habit of suspecting everyone of conspiracy does not guarantee that there are no grounds for being so suspicious. So, the reaction of British and American commentators watching PRC President Xi Jinping’s visiting France, Hungary and Serbia looks, technically, legit.
The tour itself took place last week and stood out with a warm welcome of the Chinese leader in all the three European capitals. The US does have grounds for its vehement reaction to the PRC President’s European tour: China is placing one of its stakes on using France, Germany and some other EU states as ‘a weak link’ within the broader Western coalition aimed at preventing its global hegemony.
This division will not be fatal for the US positions in Europe: the Americans still have a firm grip strangling their minor allies. However, the close relations of China and a part of continental Europe can do some harm to the American diplomacy, already ‘torn apart’ by numerous gaps in its positions.
It should be noted that the Chinese authorities themselves have never stated that they intended to break Europeans off from the US. Moreover, this is what official Beijing always underscores in public statements and brings to the notice of the expert community via closed information channels. It is doing this in such a convincing manner, which even bothers some observers from Russia. Although, effectively, we should welcome any efforts of the Chinese friends to cast doubt in the slender ranks of ‘the collective West’.
China’s actions are based on a few intentions, prerequisites and its own subjective views on what the world politics means.
First, China is trying to postpone being dragged into a direct conflict with the US and its allies as much as possible. This a strategic confrontation related to a simple competition to access global resources and sales markets. It is also about a potential trouble spot, Taiwan, whose actual independence is supported in the US, which is also supplying it with arms.
Europeans do not have significant stakes in the confrontation between the US and China at all. And their attitude to being involved is strictly negative. This confrontation is also regarded in Europe from two perspectives. On the one hand, the confrontation with China might lead to the US curbing its presence in Europe and further laying the burden of struggling with Russia on the shoulders of its European allies. However, on the other hand, Paris and Berlin will have a chance to gradually improve their relations with Russia, which, obviously, they have been striving for, albeit acting under numerous restrictions.
Given such a behaviour of Europeans, the PRC believes the more indefinite Europe’s position is, the later the US will start a full-blown attack against it. And this ultimately works within China’s main strategy – to defeat the US without a direct armed conflict, which China fears quite reasonably.
Second, of course, the breakup of economic ties between China and Europe will deal a significant blow at Europeans, doing even more harm to China’s wealth and economy. The EU today is China’s second top foreign trade partner after ASEAN states. This includes all the EU members, but everyone understands that the continental partners (Germany, France and Italy) are contributing the most. The Netherlands joins them being Europe’s transportation hub. This is why China’s relations with these countries are expressly warm, with mutual visits featuring new investment and trade agreements signed.
Therefore, dilution of relations, let alone a breakup, with Europe is a great danger for the Chinese economy working for the sake of people’s welfare, the key achievement of the Chinese authorities since the 1970s. Beijing does not want to put this at risk, as otherwise the main asset to support public policies and a source of national pride will be no longer available. Especially when China is seeing how reluctant the Europeans to be involved in the US sanctions campaign against Russia. This confirms that the main EU states will not go for breaking economic ties with China voluntarily. And for Serbia, which welcomed President Xi most cordially, there is also an opportunity to intercept political positions of the West. Serbia seeks no prospects to join the EU or NATO, so China, with its wealth, is a real alternative for Belgrade.
Third, China believes quite sincerely that economy plays the key role in world politics. Despite its ancient origins, the Chinese foreign policy culture is a product of the Marxist thinking paradigm when the economic ‘base’ drives the political ‘superstructure’. It is impossible to challenge this opinion. Even more so, with China’s global political positions acquired in the recent decade being the result of its economic success and wealth created with its own hands.
And it is absolutely not important that economic achievements did not help Beijing solve any of its truly important objectives in world politics – the Taiwan issue, the full recognition of Tibet a Chinese territory or maritime territorial disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines. The most important thing is that the voice of Chinese diplomacy can be heard in global politics. And this is quite visible for ordinary Chinese citizens whose confidence in their homeland’s shiny prospects is an important foreign policy factor. As a result, Beijing is assured that enhancing its economic ties with the EU is the most reliable way to make its leading powers restrain the US ‘adventurist’ politics with regard to the Chinese issue.
Now, what do Europeans themselves need from relations with China? Well, things can vary. For Germany and France, the Chinese track is important in terms of economic ties. Small states which Xi Jinping has visited simply want Chinese investments to balance the influence of Brussels and Washington. Coming back to Hungary, China’s economic presence has always been significant there.
From a political standpoint, China is another stake placed by France in its manoeuvres between full obeyance to the US and a certain degree of independence. There are no grounds to think that Paris is seriously waiting that PRC will support its plans about the Ukrainian crisis. And they also do not believe in a serious influence of Beijing on Moscow – they are not that silly even with Emmanuel Macron. However, Paris considers meetings and talks with the Chinese leader to be an asset for the French diplomacy. The same as Kazakhstan considers contacts with the West or China as an asset in talks with Russia. Of course, no one is going ‘to do a bad turn’ to the US not to get a good blow in response. But playing a small independence game is always a good option.
I would venture to suggest that this is neither a foreign policy challenge for Russia, nor a threat to our positions. The relations between Moscow and Beijing are not at the level when any of them could have serious intrigues behind each other’s back. While the reduction of competition and sliding towards a conflict between China and the West can be even beneficial tactic-wise: there are no reasons to think that Russia would be interested in crushing the global economy or the consolidation of all China’s resources to counter the American attack.