It takes a critical number of disenfranchised and morally decadent people for Europe to take on its neighbours. A good example would be Ukraine with its three decades’ worth of failed statehood.
Current opinion polls show that Europeans do not exhibit any hostility towards Russia. Despite the recent talk of a probable military conflict coming from some European top generals and even politicians, regular Europeans do not see Russia as a threat. Hence their lack of an aggressive stance. But this trend may reverse, affected mostly by Russia’s Western neighbours’ domestic plight rather than the changing geopolitical landscape.
The Russia–NATO military and political conflict over Ukraine has given rise to an unprecedented barrage of hostile rhetoric both in the media and among the Western political elites. This rhetoric can be seen running its course.
The distribution of toles among Russia’s various opponents in Europe and North America is hard to miss too. At the current juncture, the military, for one, represents the most vocal faction. Almost every week the Russian media has to discuss a new statement by a British, Danish or Dutch general citing the allegedly inevitable armed clash between Russia and NATO within a couple of years’ time.
European media outlets reveal NATO’s latest ‘secret plans’ to confront Russia just as regularly. These are mostly the scenarios of hypothetical military drills never intended for mass readership. But then again, can it be taken at face value? There is a sneaking suspicion that these statements may be somewhat misleading. Bear in mind that the masterminds of the Ukrainian crisis, the Americans, remain tight-lipped on the subject and are not particularly excited about broaching a direct armed conflict with Russia.
However, it is a whole different story when it comes to the US European allies. First, Europe’s military leaders and politicians alike do not feel like they can be held accountable for what they say publicly. As long as it is Washington that is in charge of NATO’s decision-making with regards to defence and security, any European general or official can prattle on all they want. When push comes to shove, their words mean nothing. Moreover, military spending is controlled by civil authorities that are not eager to shell out for military exercises.
Second, the European military clearly sees that politicians are hesitant to deliver on the vows they gave early into the conflict. In March 2022, the German chancellor announced a turnaround in the nation’s defence policy towards increased military expenses and a buildup of the country’s military potential. So far, none of that has been executed, whereas Germany’s economy cannot afford extra spending other than covering the citizens’ needs and the corporate sector.
Third, people in the media take a profound interest in a ‘potential war against Russia’ as it sounds like an easy sell. That is why the generals have to answer the direct questions they simply cannot dodge due to them being intellectually inflexible. Besides, preparing to wage a war is part of their job description, even though they clearly realise they will not get the chance to wage it. This is the kind of trap the civil leadership of the military agencies are also liable to. Several days ago journalists were busy trying to read a hint of hostility into an interview given by the Polish defence minister.
Notably, the US officials as well as those from Eastern Europe that are directly involved in military planning exercise a lot more restraint. Even the leaders and the military of the Baltic states have yet to sound the alarm the way their Western European counterparts have already done. NATO’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, has never brought up a direct conflict as a foreseeable threat either.
This can be explained by the restraint on the part of the US along with better-oiled coordination between the US and those who represent their interests in Europe. It goes without saying, the German, Swedish, Dutch or Danish generals do not boast the level of coordination with Washington shown by Warsaw. On top of that, for all their opportunism and itch to challenge Russia as boots on the ground, the Americans – credit is where credit is due – are treading cautiously when it comes to strategic affairs.
The assessments of European generals and official contrast even more starkly with the opinions held by regular Europeans. On the heels of the Bundeswehr general’s remarks weighing the odds of a war with Russia, a recent poll showed that 71 per cent of Germans dismiss Russia as a military threat.
The recently published Munich Security Index, a list of Europeans’ risk perceptions, drafted at the West’s major conference focusing on its relations with the rest of the world, has seen Russia demoted to the ninth spot as it has been overtaken by economic issues and climate change. Evidently, Europeans do not perceive Russia as a threat. More importantly, though, they have no reason to adopt a hostile stance towards Russia.
Major armed conflicts like world wars are always spurred by socioeconomic factors. Before part of the traditionally shrewd German nation could lose their minds and turn into unhinged savages, the country had found itself in the doldrums, both psychologically and economically, in the 1920s. Prior to that, the demographic growth coupled with the unresolved industrialisation-related problems prompted a lot of Germans to spring into action during World War I.
One way or the other, it takes a critical number of disenfranchised and morally decadent people for Europe to take on its neighbours. A good example would be Ukraine with its three decades’ worth of failed statehood. Differently put, the odds of Europeans unleashing a war against Russia – which is the only possible cause of a potential conflict – are heavily dependent on their own plight.
It is therefore paramount these days to follow the trajectory and the developments in Europe’s economy. The rather unsound ‘sanctions’ policy towards Russia and a partial falling-out in terms of trade have already delivered a blow to European businesses. Add to it a wealth of domestic issues, the growing competition with American and Chinese companies, and an overall recession of global economy.
For example, a recent bombshell story broken by a Western news agency brought up leading manufacturing companies pulling out of Germany in search of better markets and investment conditions. Other large European states have encountered their fair share of trouble too. In case these troubling tendencies begin to erode Europe’s welfare state model, the public sentiment may start shifting.
We do not know for a fact the extent of Europeans’ backlash to a deteriorating economic state. Nor can we put a finger on the timeline. In all likelihood, the practical implications of Europe’s economic decline will not affect other nations in the coming 20 to 30 years. Moreover, no one can be certain if the behavioural patterns Europeans were prone to in the first half of the 20th century will reproduce in the future. History does not tend to repeat itself, which makes historical analogies rather futile in understanding the reality.