G20 is effectively a symbol of the past age and a test polygon where the world trains its global politics skills. The demise of the Group of 20 expected earlier did not happen, to its creators’ disappointment. On the contrary, it has acquired a new cause.
Partially due to media efforts and partially because of objective circumstances, yet the emotional tension around the war and political conflict between Russia and the West is topping its highest degree these days. And there is little doubt that we will witness quite a few more moments like these: U.S. and Europe are reaping enormous benefits from their power monopoly, while Russia and China’s resolve to change this has been quite consistent. So, one should not think that the new international order will set smoothly and that we can be relatively unconcerned about foreign policy for quite a long time.
When things are so dramatic, one might pose a question on why we need global structures at all, if the future is to be decided at battlefields. Well, these doubts could first of all concern such organisations as G20, which is hosting its summit in Brazil these days. Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister and the most seasoned world’s diplomat is representing Russia, which has become quite a tradition lately. Almost all other countries are attending at the level of heads of state and government.
The Group of 20 is a symbol of the past age and at the same time a test polygon where the world trains its global politics skills. U.S. and Great Britain created it during the 2008 crisis to spread the responsibility for their mistakes among the rest of humanity. However, leaders of major developing nations are readily using it today to establish themselves in a world, which is replacing the Western dominance.
Like much more in this world, G20’s future depends on the capability of the West to adapt to losing its privilege. Or, more specifically, on how consistent and cautious other countries will be. Those which are completely against living in line with U.S. and Europe’s instructions and furnish them with all they need, but also unwilling to ruin globalisation, which is bringing benefits for everyone.
The idea itself to have a tool for G7 countries to keep an eye on what others were up to appeared during the financial crisis in Asia in late 1990s. At that time, it became obvious that Asian economies’ growth rates and scale could impact the entire world. After the Cold War, U.S. felt confidence and was thinking of letting some countries beyond its closest satellites discuss critical issues.
All the more so, at the time the West was generally sure that China, while developing its economy further, will also refuse from its full sovereignty and become part of the liberal global order. The G20 inaugural conference took place in Berlin in December 1999. But right after that everyone forgot the new global structure for good. In the U.S., the power was taken over by the forces deciding to hold it with the use of force. The fact that this power was gradually eroding was obvious for many at the time. And instead of at least a partial split of privileges with a broader list of stakeholders, Washington just tried to intimidate everyone.
The result was the military invasions in Afghanistan (1991) and Iraq (2003) causing doubts about Americans’ sanity even in France and Germany. The economic crisis of 2008–2013 drew the final bottom line in the U.S. crusade to obtain global dominance. As we remember, it started from the mortgage crisis in U.S. and further evolved into a global financial crisis. This was not surprising, as no one was solving domestic economic issues in America, and the only hope was that the world, frightened by the American might, will give everything on a silver platter itself.
This did not happen. Moreover, it seems that in 2008–2009 leading states beyond the West understood that there was nothing significant to expect from U.S. and EU, except for trouble. The West understood this quite quickly and started panicking: they had to find a way to preserve at least some control over others’ behaviour. Just to remind, all this happened at the time when Vladimir Putin delivered his Munich speech and when China pivoted to the policy inspired by Xi Jinping.
At the same time, no one in the West cared to share any authority to manage the global economy with anyone else. The tasks were, first, to make the anti-crisis measures of governments across the world beneficial for U.S. and, secondly, for Europe at a global scale. Second, they were aimed at creating the visibility of a universal conviction that no fundamental changes were needed for the global economy.
Americans readily accepted the neoliberal market model, they did not know how to build it and they simply focused on solving tactical tasks. Preserving G7 where the Western nations discussed their relations with the world around them in a narrow circle guaranteed that the decisions offered for G20’s consideration will fit the interests of those to blame for the economic shocks.
So, when the global crisis degree gradually lowered by 2012 for the West, G20’s purpose was lost to an extent. This was the time of a potential finale for G20 implying that this structure would soon be forgotten. The attempts of Russia and developing nations to advance the creation of a more or less fair economic oder were usually blown off by the West. U.S.-backed newspapers and news agencies started writing about the decision-making crisis at such a large-scale forum.
Well, U.S. and Europe favour convincing us of the inefficiency of something, which does not bring them instant benefits. Opinions like these could generally be an indicator that if Bloomberg, Reuters or British papers are criticising anything across the world, it is something good and promising. Or, if they commend something, this is surely rubbish or another trick the West is contemplating.
But the expected death did not happen for G20 ten years ago: quite a miracle, and a disappointment for its creators. On the contrary, it has acquired a new cause. Its most recent summit where there was at least some unanimity took place in Saint Petersburg in September 2013. But in just a few months the Ukrainian crisis broke out and the next G20 meeting in Australia fully focused on U.S. and Europe’s backlash against Russia. At that time, the Western nations tried to use G20 again, this time for political purposes. This did not work though: major countries already established the BRICS, while others did not strive to isolate Moscow in its foes’ current interests at all.
Like in many other matters, when it comes to relations with today’s world, the main mistake U.S. and Europe made after the start of the special military operation was the attempt to set others before a choice: it’s either we or Russia. G20 meetings, which followed in Indonesia (2022) and India (2023), showed that no one except for U.S. allies was going to make this choice. And while Indonesia, being more dependent on the West, tried to calm U.S. and EU down, India just ignored them. At the current summit in Brazil no one is even trying to condemn Russia.
The global majority agrees to talk with the West and even accepts some of its economic initiatives and proposals. But it fully excludes the possibility of making G20 a battlefield to fight against Russia and, eventually, against China. It is hard to say how stable these dynamics will be: the West can still ‘go off the rails’ and start ruining everything it cannot control. However, so far it looks like G20 has found its new cause.