Hundreds of bunkers, tankproof ‘dragon’s teeth’ and even currently banned weapons, as envisioned by the leaders of the Baltic Nations, should become an insurmountable barrier on the path of ‘Russia’s aggression’. However, the past examples show how these states usually create fortifications in the border with Russia.
After a meeting on January 19 in Riga, the defence ministers of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia agreed the building of a “Baltic defence line”. It is not yet clear what it will look like – according to the statement ‘more exact plans’ are now being prepared. However, it is known that this line will include the construction of many underground bunkers. It is expected up to 600 bunkers will appear in Estonia’s border areas.
The anti-tank structures, the so-called ‘dragon’s teeth’, will protect the Baltic Nations along with barbed wire. But this is not all. Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Estonian Parliament, Lieutenant Colonel Leo Kunnas believes it is important to use both anti-personnel mines and tank mines for the construction of the defence structures near the border. To do this, Kunnas believes, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania must collectively withdraw from the Ottawa Convention (adhered to by 163 states) on the prohibition of using AP mines.
‘We recently had a visit from the U.S. Ambassador to the National Defense Committee, and I asked him about this attitude because the United States of America is not a party to the Ottawa Convention. The ambassador said very simply that the United States cannot join this convention because on the Korean peninsula, there are American troops alongside South Korean troops ready to repel North Korean aggression, the depth of the defences is so shallow that without anti-personnel mines it is not possible to maintain those defences. And the Baltic States are known to have even less depth than South Korea’, Kunnas said.
By the way, the Latvian military share this opinion, having called for the withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention. ‘Are we ready to risk the lives of our soldiers because sometime in the future after the war, after our victory, there can be some restrictions preventing civilians from visiting forests? How much will the cost of mine clearing matter if the mere existence of the country is at stake?
The enemy will use AP mines in Latvia’s territory without any hesitations. And we cut this possibility for ourselves through a noble and not quite feasible way in the current geopolitical context’, explains the Latvian military expert, the author of Vara bungas blog Mārtiņš Vērdiņš.
According to Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs, ‘if our military experts, leaders of the military forces indeed believe this is a step in the right direction to strengthen the defence capacity of our country’, the government will certainly support it. The signature collection to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention has already started in Latvia.
Kaido Tiitos, an official of the Ministry of Defence of Estonia, said the cost of the facilities to be built on the border will amount to EUR 60 m for his country, according to first estimates. Before the immediate threat, mines, barbed wire and ‘dragon’s teeth’ will not be placed in the area of the expected attack but stored in advance in nearby locations. Their installation across the territory will begin in early 2025. Yet, first it is necessary to agree and coordinate this with landowners, because most of the future defence zone is located on private estates.
The final bunker design is still being developed, but one of the criteria is fast and easy installation performed even by soldiers themselves.
‘It would be good if these bunkers were somewhat modular for easy transportation and construction’, said Head of the Operational Department, General Staff, Estonian Defence Forces Tarmo Kundla. Further, according to Tiitus, a bunker should accommodate one platoon (i. e. around 10 persons) in the area of 35 square meters.
Some of the former servicemen took the news about the massive construction of border bunkers ironically. Alexey Stefanof, a journalist who migrated from Latvia to Russia and was in the Latvian army in early 90s, remembers that they were trained to conduct attacks in the reconnaissance and assault squadron.
‘But after three months of the service they sent the defence advisor, the American lieutenant of Latvian origin whose last name was Linde. He changed the squadron’s training approach completely. Lieutenant Linde cancelled close combat training and started training exercises in the forest – he trained the skills to escape from the enemy, hide in the forest and wait. And this was the training for the assault force…
We did not understand what we were supposed to wait for – some backup or death. But we executed his orders with fun because we thought Linde was a fool. But look now, the fool turned out to be a prophet. Only, at the time they trained us not to hide in bunkers, but to make shelters of fir-trees. But it was almost the same’, says Stefanov.
The chief editor of Baltnews portal Andrey Starikov, born in Riga, believes that Baltic officials expect to make some money from the construction of the fortification line. ‘They started building this line long before the special military operation. They are still building fences on the Russian border. It is officially a militarist project, but in reality, it is a huge budget milking which involved relevant agencies and contractors.
The Baltic Nations joined their efforts through a collective statement and a collective coordination memorandum on preparing for the war with Russia. The US do not consider the Baltic Nations individually. It is easier to ask for money as a group’, said Starikov.
It is worth recalling that the leaders of the Baltic Nations have taken the decision to strengthen the border not today at all.
As early as in 2016, the Estonian authorities announced they would build a 2.5 meter high fence along the border equipped with cameras, infrared sensors and sound detectors. It was expected to spend EUR 71 m on all that. They wanted to complete the construction of ‘the Great Estonian Wall’ in 2018 but could finish just two pilot sections. The Interior Ministry admitted there had been no basic calculation of soil parameters, with no ground water and multiple wetlands presence accounted for.
Finally, the new MoI head Andres Anvelt said the border development project would cost EUR 100 m more. It was further confirmed the border fortification and its maintenance would require EUR 320 m. The head of the parliamentary faction of the opposition party EKRE Martin Helme made a reveal statement: ‘It is clear there is much air pumped in this project. Quite many contractors – from crushed stone supplier to vendors of various instruments – swiftly found a sweet spot to earn from. The Government should find the courage and tell them: ‘Stop it! The border is being built not to make you rich’.
A statement of the State Inspection Agency followed. They found that Estonia’s eastern border can be protected at a much lower cost. The Agency notes that ‘at the project design stage, to a certain extent, there have been all alarming signals to be considered in the management of major public projects’.
A more flagrant incident happened in Latvia. In September 2019, the Internal Security Bureau detained the person who had just recently held one of the most responsible positions in the country, the former State Border Guard Chief Normund Garbars. Together with him, two employees of Igate construction company were also arrested. At the time, the MoI claimed that ‘crimes were committed during the work to build the infrastructure on the borderline with Russia and Belarus’. The former State Border Guard Chief was ‘suspected in the abuse of office and covering up embezzlement’. The investigation is still under way.