Europe is actively discussing the idea of replacing the American ‘nuclear umbrella’ with the French one. What does the French nuclear arsenal look like, what is the unique feature of the French nuclear doctrine and why implementing this idea is not that easy, as it might first seem?
The wish of the French president Emmanuel Macron to extend the French ‘nuclear umbrella’ to the entire Europe instead of the American one caused a hot discussion in European countries. Poland has announced the wish to acquire nuclear weapon and the to-be German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has actually supported Macron, like Lithuania did. But what are they really expecting?
According to an estimation by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), France has 280 nuclear warheads already mounted on missiles or located at military bases and considered ready for use. There are estimated 10 warheads more in stock, which can technically be used after some preparation. We should note that this information is relevant as of January 2024 and the researchers themselves are suggesting their estimations are approximate. In any case, compared to five thousand Russian nuclear warheads, the French arsenal appears to be insignificant.
France’s nuclear doctrine basics were laid by General de Gaulle but it was designed in its final form at the time of François Mitterand. General de Gaulle believed that France must be a self-reliant state including when it comes to its own security and he even managed to withdraw his country from the military bloc NATO (however, Macron’s friend Nicolas Sarkozy returned it there in 2009).
The nuclear doctrine adopted at de Gaulle’s time implied that the French nuclear weapon must be used for defence and to protect France only. Without any overseas allies, let alone Germans with whom de Gaulle had to fight twice in his life during the world wars, he designed it only to protect France and the French.
At Miterrand’s time France added a clause in its doctrine, which can be called ‘a final warning’. It means if France sees a threat to its vital interests in the actions of a hostile state, it reserves the right of a final warning shot, a single nuclear strike on the enemy’s territory to try to end its aggression. This clause makes the French nuclear doctrine different from the doctrines of other states.
The main provisions of France’s nuclear doctrine are available at the website of the Defence Ministry and state that: ‘France’s nuclear deterrence, which guarantees the nation’s survival, is a fundamental tool for maintaining strategic balance in a complex international environment… The French nuclear deterrence has purely defensive goals: it aims to prevent any ambition on the part of a foreign leader to encroach on vital interests of France and guarantees that nuclear forces are capable of causing absolutely unacceptable damage to the enemy’s centres of power’.
France’s nuclear forces have two pillars: naval and air forces. The submarines (there are just four of them, actually) are based on Île Longue (which literally means Long Island), which, in fact, is a peninsula of the roadstead of Brest in Brittany, the department of Finistère.
The names of the submarines are notable: the Triumphant, the Bold, the Vigilant, and the Terrible. They carry 16 M51 intercontinental ballistic missiles each having several nuclear warheads. The submarines spend time docked there between patrols.
In the air forces, two Rafale squadrons implement nuclear deterrence, being capable of launching medium-range air-to-ground ASMPA missiles, together with the supporting refuelling Phénix aircraft designed on the basis of Airbus A330 (14 units). Most of the airplanes are assigned to three air force bases: Saint-Dizier, air base no. 113, in the Haute-Marne department, 1,800 personnel, Istres, air base no. 125, Bouches-du-Rhône department, 5,000+ personnel, and Avord, air base no. 702, Cher department, 2,500 personnel. The command centre was returned to air base no. 921 in Taverny, Val-d’Oise department, 500 personnel, in June 2024, and among everything else it has a bunker built 50 metres under the ground in case of a nuclear war.
France has the strategy of keeping its arsenal at the lowest possible level, which should be sufficient for the current international context and which amounts to fewer than 300 warheads (which SIPRI data confirms). The effective doctrine confirms that France refuses to accept that nuclear weapons can be used for active warfare leaving them as a tool to prevent war.
However, new weapons are still being developed in the nuclear deterrence field, in particular, the ASN4G hypersonic missile (whose range will exceed 1,000 kilometres) and the new version of Phénix refuelling aircraft.
Can France replace Europe’s nuclear umbrella with just two squadrons and four submarines, which are ‘just enough’ for its own safety? First of all, to do this, Americans will have to refuse from their obligations and, given all the circumstances, Macron’s readiness he is stating so loudly may turn out to be pure bluffing to make Donald Trump drop the mere idea of ceasing to protect his overseas allies once and for all.
But for the overseas departments, France has quite a compact territory, which is not that difficult to protect. But if at some point the Americans really decide it would be better for them to leave Europe to its fate, the French will have to learn the hard way that the territory between Brest and Nice is not the same as the territory from Lisbon to Helsinki, also including such islands as Malta, and that what is enough to protect France will no longer be enough for the entire EU. Especially given that Russia has many more warheads and delivery vehicles to carry them.
‘The ability of France to provide a reliable and permanent nuclear umbrella is limited’, writes an Italian defence news portal. ‘Today France no longer has land-based ballistic missiles, such as S-3, Pluton and Hades… It dismantled the nuclear test facility in Mururoa… and is testing (new) missiles without real warheads’, another Italian portal reminds dryly.
Germany, which feels much more enthusiastic than Italy about Macron’s offer, nevertheless points out that ‘France has only strategic nuclear weapons, not tactic ones’ and ‘we (i. e. Germany) will not be able to ensure deterrence… with France, at least not so fast… France will have to enrich its arsenal’.
Besides, Germany, pragmatic as it is, has already posed the question if it will pay for the umbrella and, if yes, how much it will cost? Moreover, Frank Sauer, a military expert, pointed out in the same article that German planes are incompatible with French missiles. The expert might have been too quick to bring up this subject but one could imagine General de Gaulle’s ghost gnashing its teeth somewhere around.
Most importantly, it will not be enough for France just to build more planes, bombs, and subs carrying nuclear missiles. It will need military satellites, specialists, new plants, the infrastructure and much more. The role of Europe’s guard will require permanent efforts and huge costs. Let alone the fact that already now Germans are really starting to speak of gaining access to nuclear weapons too. And no matter how much the French are now claiming that they will not give control over their weapons to anyone, knowing Germans, we can forecast they are not going to accept this. In other words, already now Macron’s idea of ‘a nuclear umbrella’ is causing more conflicts in Europe than conflicts it is trying to address.