‘The Bucha massacre has yet to be conclusively proven to be a fact,’ says the South Korean national defence minister. This statement is in line with the stance Moscow has consistently adhered to ever since the Kiev regime’s major provocation took place. It also defies the South Korean officials’ previous remarks. What made Seoul reconsider?
South Korea was one of the two East Asian countries (the other one being Japan) to publicly join the West in its confrontation with Russia. The South Korean businesses ceased their Russia operations; the country’s administration sanctioned Moscow.
South Korea is the US ally, and this position is deemed vital by the authorities. Besides, Seoul harboured concerns that Russia’s special operation in Ukraine could trigger the use of militaries in the East Asian conflicts. However, recently Seoul has been adjusting its formerly anti-Russian stance towards a more nuanced and fact-based approach, with national defence minister Shin Won-sik protagonising the change.
In an unexpected move, the minister walked back on his previous comments regarding the Ukraine military aid. According to him, the January interview (back then he was an MP), where he ostensibly spoke in favour of providing ‘full support’ to Ukraine, was mistranslated. ‘It appeared to be skewed wording that did not take the surrounding context into account,’ the minister explained.
Although this change in rhetoric may come across as paltry, in the eastern political culture, it effectively signals a major shift. The recent comments came in the wake of a heated exchange between the South Korean and Russian foreign ministries, the latter warning the Seoul policymakers against ‘taking impulsive actions’, while the former rallied behind Shin Won-sik and snapping back with ‘Russia’s demeanor will play an important role in the management of South Korea-Russia relations going forward’. The Russian ambassador was then summoned to South Korea’s foreign ministry, but Shin Won-sik declined to comment on the spat. Recently he brought it up again.
Seoul also refuses to supply the Kiev regime, which is running short on ammo, with new weapons. According to Shin Won-sik, South Korea will be exporting its ammo to the US, which is facing shortages after shipping the aid packages to Ukraine. In addition, the national defence ministry has repeatedly denied the US media claims that South Korea has been sending ammo to Ukraine.
Finally, the national defence minister questioned one of the West’s biggest myths about ‘Russia’s war crimes’ in Ukraine, the one about the ‘Bucha massacre’.
He said South Korea condemned Russia’s invasion, but added that ‘since [the Bucha massacre] has yet to be conclusively proven to be a fact, it would not be appropriate for me to give an assessment’.
Importantly, in 2023, Seoul was backing the myth. The presidential couple visited Bucha, which the Kiev regime had turned into a top sightseeing venue for foreign delegations, and the government called it a ‘symbol of the Russian military’s atrocities’.
Back then they completely overlooked the fact that there was no rock-solid evidence proving the ‘atrocities’. Nor did they attend to Russia’s permanent representative to the UN Vassily Nebenzia’s official statement where he insisted the streets had not been strewn with dead bodies on 31 March 2022, the day after the Russian troops had pulled out of Bucha. The corpses allegedly emerged on 3 April after the Ukrainian army rolled into town. Seoul also dismissed the investigation request the Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov had submitted to the UN secretary-general. ‘It is not being investigated. Nobody shares any information with anybody else. Can we at least have a list of people who were allegedly tortured and killed?’ the minister wondered.
At the time Seoul bought into the Bucha myth engineered by the West, the one that sparked the West’s media strategy accusing Russia of committing war crimes in Ukraine and that underlies the anti-Russian sanctions and the West’s support of Kiev.
Now the Koreans are not just challenging the Kiev-orchestrated sham. If anything, it is a major move the country’s authorities must have had serious reasons to attempt.
Although Seoul does not disclose their rationale, it can be assumed that the South Korean experts and officials alike have started to realise the Kiev regime is doomed and that the US will be phasing out the support of the Ukrainian misadventure. Therefore, it does not make sense to uphold the radical anti-Russian stance.
That being said, unlike Europe, South Korea has much more room for a diplomatic manoeuvre and the elites’ political flexibility to reconsider their Ukraine-related policy. Besides, the government explicitly mentions their willingness to relaunch their country’s products on the Russian market once the opportunity arises. This has been stated as part of their talks with Russia’s foreign ministry.
Another reason behind the apparent change of heart is the bolstered relations between Moscow and Pyongyang in both political and military aspects. In the summer of 2023, Russia’s defence minister Sergei Shoigu visited North Korea. Last September the leaders of the two countries held talks at the Vostochny Cosmodrome.
According to the Western media, Russia, North Korea and China have teamed up in what they call a ‘tripartite pact’. Or it may just be Russia and North Korea with Beijing’s silent approval. The South Korean authorities suggest that the pact will allow Pyongyang to receive Russian food products, military hardware and defence technologies. ‘We assess that Pyongyang is seeking direct military assistance from Russia to include fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles and ballistic missile production equipment or materials, as well as other advanced technology,’ commented Mira Rapp-Hooper, President Biden’s top East Asia advisor.
Although Moscow has never confirmed the reality of the ‘pact’ or arms supplies, Seoul at least believes it is a possible scenario given North Korea’s increasingly amicable stance towards Russia. Consequently, Seoul’s changing rhetoric may also be explained by their hope for Moscow’s equidistant stance in the Korean peninsula internal conflict, the one the Russian government had adhered to before South Korea backed Vladimir Zelensky’s regime and the Western sanctions.
To regain the status quo, though, Seoul will have to go further than merely refusing to perpetuate one of the biggest anti-Russian myths. However, we are definitely witnessing the split in the propaganda narrative the Western media often hails as the ‘stance of the entire civilised world’.